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1. Introduction
Various scholars have observed that average employment of labor by firms (average firm size) in
many industries in both advanced countries and newly industrialized countries has declined.  Data clearly
show that in numerous developed countries, such as the U.S., U.K., France, Austria and Belgium,
employment share of small and medium enterprises in their manufacturing industries exhibits a U-shape
pattern.  It declined initially in the 1960s and early 1970s but started to increase in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.
1  Among the newly industrialized countries, South Korea's manufacturing industries exhibit
the same pattern as the developed countries, with a turning point in the early 1980s.
2  In Taiwan, average
firm size in manufacturing measured in terms of average employment increased from 7.3 persons per firm
in 1954 to a peak of 28.2 in 1971 after which it followed a decline trend, reaching 24.2 in 1984.
3 
Similarly in the 1980s, manufacturing firms in Singapore were getting smaller in size on the average. 
This inverted U-shaped trend is not confined to manufacturing industries.  Liu (1992) shows that
in Hong Kong, besides manufacturing, industries such as business services, import/export and restaurant 
exhibit a trend of declining average firm size.  Table 1 shows the change in firm size of these four
industries measured in two ways, the average number of employees per firm and the percent of
employees engaged in firms with employees larger than 50.  The trend since the late 1970s when data
became available is generally downward.  The decline in the average size of firms is associated with an
increase in per capita real income and total factor productivity.2
Table 1: Declining Firm Size in Hong Kong
A.  Average number of employees per firm
Year    Manufacturing Import/Export Business Services     Restaurants
1978 23.72 6.35 10.67 25.27
1981 20.61 6.74 11.30 27.42
1984 19.10 6.07 10.42 28.31
1987 18.60 6.21 9.78 23.49
1990 14.47 5.45 8.50 21.30
1993 13.13 5.10 7.38 21.47
B.  Percent of employees in industry engaged in firms with employees larger than 50
Year   Manufacturing Import/Export Business Services    Restaurants
1980 58.72 23.45 52.85 59.03
1984 59.07 20.20 51.20 57.72
1987 57.77 23.14 50.47 56.25
1990 53.36 21.15 52.31 51.62
1993 52.73 18.98 45.45 42.74
Source: Annual Digest of Statistics, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government, various
years.
This trend of declining average firm size is contrary to the common perception that due to technological
change and economies of scale, firm size should get larger over time.  For instance, Kim (1989) shows
from his model that because there are economies of scale arising from increasing returns due to
specialization, firm size gets larger with specialization and the extent of the market. Our study provides an
explanation of why firm size may get smaller over time on the basis of an analysis of the division of labor
and transaction cost.  We will show that the institution of the firm will emerge if the transaction efficiency
for labor is higher than that for intermediate goods. By transaction efficiency we measures the fraction of
the purchased good which disappears in transit due to transaction cost.  Transaction competes for time and
management.  For instance, a producer of an intermediate good can either pay the search cost to find a
supplier of the primary good used in its production or the managerial monitoring cost of in-house
production of the primary good. We will show that given the emergence of firms, their size (measured by
employment) decreases if the transaction efficiency for intermediate goods becomes higher than that for3
labor.  The decrease in the size of firms is driven by two forces.  First, each firm becomes more
specialized if division of labor develops among firms, so that each firm's scope of activities is reduced. 
However, if division of labor and specialization are developed within each firm, the level of specialization
of each worker in a firm and the scope of the firm may increase hand in hand.  But if the transaction
efficiency for intermediate goods is higher than that for labor, then organizing division of labor between
more specialized firms will be more efficient than organizing division of labor within a firm since the
former involves more transactions of intermediate goods while the latter involves more trade in labor,
thus generating a decline in the size of firms.
4
Several recent studies including Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),  Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), Kreps (1990), and Lewis and Sappington (1991) explain the size of the firm in various
ways.  None of these models, however, can predict the negative relationship between an increase in per
capita real income and the average size of firms, nor can they explore the interaction between that
negative relationship and the level of specialization.
Our model extends the Camacho's (1991, 1996) analysis of the tradeoff between benefits of division of
labor and coordination costs as an explanation of the optimal size of the firm. Echoing Jones' empirical
works (1995 a,b) which conclusively reject a scale effect, our theory explains economic development on
the basis of the division of labor instead of economies of scale.
5  It in effect formalizes Allyn Young's
(1928) criticism of the notion of economies of scale.  It is also in keeping with the arguments of Young,
Stigler (1951), Cheung (1983), and Langlois (1988) which imply that the size of the firm may increase or
decrease, depending on whether division of labor is organized through the labor market or through the
market for intermediate goods.
In Section 2 a model of consumer-producers with economies of specialization in production and
transaction costs in trading is presented.  Section 3 characterizes eight market structures that may emerge
from the development in division of labor and identifies the general equilibrium by comparing per capita
real incomes in different structures.  The main theoretical results of the paper on the emergence of the4
institution of the firm and average employment are contained in Section 4.  The paper concludes in
Section 5.
2. A Model with Consumer-producers, Economies of Specialization and Transaction Costs
We consider an economy with M ex ante identical consumer-producers (where M is assumed
large).  There is a single consumer good z, the amount of this good that an individual self-provides is
denoted by z and the amounts sold and purchased are respectively z
s and z
d . A fraction 1-k of z
d
disappears in transit because of transaction costs. Hence, the quantity that a person receives from the
purchase of z
d is kz
d. Total consumption is thus z+kz
d. 1-k is referred to as the transaction cost
coefficient for food and k is referred to as the transaction efficiency coefficient or simply transaction
efficiency for the consumer good.  An alternative formulation is to introduce an explicit time constraint on
the consumer-producers in such a way that producing the good takes a certain amount of time but
purchasing it takes more or less time.
6  The individual maximizes the objective function u (which can be
interpreted as utility) given by total consumption:
u = z+kz
d (1)





(1-a)a , a˛(0,1) and a>1 (2)
where x and x
d are the respective quantities of the intermediate good self-provided and purchased. r is the
transaction efficiency of the intermediate good.  1-r is the transaction cost coefficient for a unit of the
intermediate good purchased and therefore rx
d is the quantity received by a person who buys x
d.  The
parameter a is the elasticity of output with respect to input of the intermediate good and can be interpreted5
as the relative importance of the roundabout productive sector compared to labor.  The degree of
economies of specialization is represented by a.






(1-a)a, a˛(0,1) and a>1 (3)
where x
s is the quantity of the intermediate good sold and y and y
d are, respectively, the quantities of the
primary good self-provided and purchased. 1-t is the transaction cost coefficient for the primary good (t is
the transaction efficiency) and ty
d is the amount that a person receives from the purchase of y
d.  It is also
assumed that fraction 1-s of goods produced by an employee within a firm disappears when it is delivered
to the employer because of transaction cost of labor. The production function for the primary good is
y+y
s = Ly
a , a>1 (4)
where y
s is the quantity of the primary good sold.  The labor endowment constraint for each individual is
Lz+Lx+Ly = 1,     Li˛[0, 1],   i=z,x,y. (5)
where Li is a person's level of specialization in producing good i.   
This system of production exhibits economies of specialization.  The total factor productivity of
the consumer good and the labor productivity of the primary good increase with the level of specialization
in producing a good concerned.  But economies of specialization are individual specific and do not extend
beyond the scale of an individual's working time.  Also, they are related to diseconomies of an
individual's scope of activities.6
There are 2







Following the approach of Borland and Yang (1995), we can exclude many combinations of zero and
nonzero variables from the list of candidates for an individual's optimal decision.
3. Configurations, Market Structures and General Equilibrium
A combination of zero and nonzero variables that is compatible with the Kuhn-Tucker condition
and other conditions for the optimum decision is called a configuration. For each configuration, an
individual can solve for a corner solution for a given set of relative prices of traded goods. A combination
of configurations that satisfies the market clearing conditions is called a market structure, or simply
structure. There are eight market structures if the institution of the firm is allowed.  We define the firm as
contractual arrangements which involve asymmetric relationship between an employer and his employees
and the production of intermediate goods using labor. The employer has control rights of his employees'
labor and claims the difference between the firm's revenue and wage bill. 
The eight market structures include autarky, two structures involving partial division of labor with
no firm and two with firm, one structure involving complete division of labor with no firm and two with
firms.  The eight market structures and the combination of configurations that make up these structures
are categorized and characterized as follows:
Autarky
1. Structure A






d = 0.  In this structure
each individual self-provides all goods he needs.7
Partial Division of Labor With No Firm
2. Structure P1
Configuration 1: an individual sells the consumer good, self-provides the intermediate good, and
buys the primary good
Configuration 2: an individual sells the primary good, and buys the consumer good
3. Structure P2
Configuration 1: an individual sells the intermediate good, self-provides the primary good, and
buys the consumer good
Configuration 2: an individual sells the consumer good, and buys the intermediate good
Partial Division of Labor With Firm
4. Structure PF1
Configuration 1: an individual sells the consumer good, self-provides the intermediate good,
buys labor, and directs workers to produce the primary good in his firm
Configuration 2: an individual sells labor which is hired to produce the primary good by a firm,
and buys the consumer good
5. Structure PF2
Configuration 1: an individual sells labor which is hired by a firm to produce the intermediate
good and the primary good in the firm, and buys the consumer good
Configuration 2: an individual sells the consumer good, buys labor, and directs each worker to
produce both the primary and the intermediate goods.
Complete Division of Labor With No Firm
6. Structure C
Configuration 1: an individual sells the consumer good, and buys the intermediate good
Configuration 2: an individual sells the primary good, and buys the consumer good8
Configuration 3: an individual sells the intermediate good, and buys the primary good and the
consumer good
Complete Division of Labor With Firm
7. Structure CF1
Configuration 1: an individual sells the consumer good, buys the primary good, hires workers
and directs them to produce the intermediate good using the primary good in
his firm
Configuration 2: an individual sells the primary good, and buys the consumer good
Configuration 3: an individual sells labor which is hired by a firm to produce the intermediate
good, and buys the consumer good
8. Structure CF2
Configuration 1: an individual sells the consumer good, buys labor, and directs some of the
workers to produce the primary good and others to produce the intermediate
good using the primary good
Configuration 2: an individual sells labor which is hired by a firm to produce the intermediate
good, and buys the consumer good
Configuration 3: an individual sells labor which is hired by a firm to produce the primary good,
and buys the consumer good
A corner equilibrium for a certain structure is defined by a set of relative prices of traded goods
and a set of relative numbers of individuals choosing different configurations that equilibrate total corner-
demand to total corner-supply of each traded goods and equalize all individuals' consumption levels. 
Here, competition among ex ante identical consumption-maximizing individuals, combined with free entry
into each configuration, implies that all configurations in a structure will be chosen only if consumption is9
equalized across the configurations. In this section, the corner equilibria for the eight structures are first
solved.
  A two-step approach developed in Yang and Ng (1993) is used to solve for the corner equilibrium
for each of the eight market structures.  As an illustration, the algebra for solving for the corner
equilibrium for structure PF1 is shown as follows.
Solving for the Corner Equilibrium for Structure PF1
Structure PF1 consists of configurations 1 and 2 as summarized earlier. The individual decision
problem for configuration 1 is










s (material balance in a firm)
Lx+Lz=1 (endowment constraint for the employer's labor)
y
s=Ly
a (production function for an employee)
Ly=1 (endowment constraint for an employee)
pzz
s = wn (budget constraint for the firm)
where Lx and Lz are the employer's labor allocation to the production of x and z respectively.  n is the
number of workers hired by an employer.  Ly is an employee's labor which is subject to the employer's
control.  y
s is each employee's output of y within the firm. y
d is the total output level of y in the firm or
input requirement for the production of x in the firm. w is the wage rate, and s is the transaction
efficiency for labor or 1-s is the transaction cost coefficient of labor in terms of the loss of goods
produced out of labor in transit. If 1-s is assumed to be in terms of the loss of labor in transit, the essence















where n is demand for labor by the firm. z
s is supply of z by the firm, and uz is the indirect objective
(utility) function for configuration 1. The decision for configuration 2 is fixed as follows.
uy = kz
d = kw/pz (objective function)
wLy=pzz
d, Ly = 1, (budget and endowment constraints)
where uy is the indirect objective function (utility) of an employee.
The consumption equalization condition uz=uy yields the corner equilibrium relative price w/pz
and the market clearing condition for good z, Mzz
s=Myz
d, yields the relative number of individuals
choosing the two configurations. Here, My/Mz=n is the corner equilibrium relative number of individuals
choosing to be employees to those choosing to be employers, which happens to be the same as the corner
equilibrium value of n, a decision variable for an employer. The solution for the corner equilibrium is
summarized in Table 2.
Following this procedure, the corner equilibria in all market structures can be solved.  Table 2
summarizes these solutions.  A general equilibrium is defined as a fixed point that satisfies the following
two conditions: (i) each individual uses inframarginal analysis to maximize his consumption respect to
configurations and quantities of each good produced, consumed, and traded for a given set of relative
prices of traded goods and a given set of the numbers of individuals selling different goods; and (ii) the
set of relative prices of traded goods and the set of individuals selling different goods clear the markets for
traded goods and equalize consumption for all individuals selling different goods. Yang and Ng (1993,
Chapter 6) have proved that in this kind of models, the general equilibrium is the corner equilibrium that
generates the highest per capital real income.
8  The other corner equilibria are not general equilibria.11
Table 2: Solutions to Corner Equilibria of Market Structures
Market
Structure
Relative Price Labor Allocation Real Per Capita Income
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A revealed preference argument can be used to show that each corner equilibrium is locally
Pareto optimal for a given structure (See Yang and Ng, 1993).  Hence, the general equilibrium is globally
Pareto optimal. This implies that the competitive market can efficiently coordinate division of labor to
fully utilize network division of labor.  This result critically depends on the assumption that economies of
specialization are individual specific and different from economies of scale.
4. Development in Division of Labor and Average Employment
A comparison between per capita real incomes generated by the eight market structures yields
Proposition 1
(1)  As transaction efficiency is improved, the general equilibrium shifts from structure A first to
structure P1 or PF1, followed by P2 or PF2, and finally to structure C, CF1, or CF2. This process
increases per capita real income, productivity, trade dependence, individuals' level of specialization,
and the number of specialized activities.
(2)  The institution of the firm will emerge from the development in division of labor if transaction
efficiency is higher for labor than for intermediate goods.
(3)  Given the emergence of the institution of the firm from the development in division of labor, the
average employment increases if the transaction efficiency for labor is higher than that for
intermediate goods.  It decreases if transaction efficiency is improved in such a way that the
transaction efficiency for intermediate goods becomes higher than that for labor.
Proposition 1 is proved in the Appendix. The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. There is a
tradeoff between economies of specialization and transaction costs. Individuals will choose a low level of
specialization and a large scope of production activities if transaction efficiency is low because economies
of specialization are outweighed by transaction costs generated by a high level of division of labor. As13
transaction efficiency is improved, the equilibrium level of specialization increases and the equilibrium
scope of each individual's production activities becomes narrower.  As the level of division of labor
increases with improvements in transaction efficiency, two types of market structure can be used to
organize a higher level of division of labor.  The first involves markets for final and intermediate goods
and the second involves markets for final goods and for labor. If the transaction efficiency for labor hired
to produce an intermediate good is higher than that for the intermediate good, the institution of the firm
will emerge from division of labor. If the institution of the firm emerges, but the transaction efficiency for
intermediate goods is improved more quickly than that for labor, then the equilibrium size and scope of
firms will decrease as each individual increases his level of specialization and narrows down his scope of
production activities. 
The decrease in the average employment is driven by two forces. First, each firm becomes more
specialized if division of labor between firms and individuals develops, so that each firm's scope of
activities is reduced.  Second, if the transaction efficiency is improved in such a way that the transaction
efficiency for intermediate goods becomes higher than that for labor, then organizing division of labor
between more specialized firms and individuals will be more efficient than organizing division of labor
within a firm since the former involves more transactions of intermediate goods while the latter involves
more trade in labor. Hence, an increase in the level of specialization of firms and an increase in division
of labor between small scale firms and individuals will occur, generating a decline in average employment
of firms.
To illustrate the shifting of market structures.  Suppose the initial values of parameters are such
that the transaction efficiencies for final and intermediate goods are very low but the transaction efficiency
for the intermediate good is higher than for labor.  Then the general equilibrium will be autarky, as shown
in the Appendix.  If the transaction efficiencies for final and intermediate goods are improved while the
transaction efficiency for labor is still lower than for intermediate goods, then the general equilibrium will
be structure P1 where firms and labor market do not exist and completely specialized producers of14
primary good exchange it for final good with non-specialized producers of intermediate and final goods in
the market.  Suppose the transaction efficiencies for final goods and labor are improved relative to the
transaction efficiency of the intermediate good, then the general equilibrium will shift to structure PF2
where a specialist producer of final good hires ka/(1-a) workers and directs each of them to produce
primary and intermediate goods within a firm. In PF2, each firm produces three goods and the level of
specialization of workers is not high although it is higher than in autarky. If the transaction efficiency for
primary good is sufficiently improved such that it is higher than the transaction efficiency for labor which
in turn is higher than that for the intermediate good, then the general equilibrium will shift from PF2 to
structure CF1 where a specialist producer of final good hires ak workers, buys the primary good, and
directs the workers to specialize in producing the intermediate good using the primary good within his
firm.
For this particular exogenous changing pattern of values of parameters, the general equilibrium
will shift along the path represented by the structure sequence A￿P1￿PF2￿ CF1 in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Development in Division of Labor and Structure of Firms15
The development of specialization in output associated with a decrease in the scope of a firm's
activities, an increase in specialization of labor assignment within firms and replacement of self-provision
of intermediate goods with market procurement, are common in the economy.  For instance, law firms
may give up providing a full range of legal services to specialize in only one or two aspects of the legal
practice such as conveyancing or family law.  Specialization in labor assignment is also common in
manufacturing assembling and processing.  A manufacturing firm may purchase intermediate services
such as advertising, storage and trucking in the market instead of advertising its own products and
operating its own warehouses and fleet of trucks.
To summarize, all patterns of changes in division of labor that involve a decrease in average
employment of firms are listed in (6a), and those patterns that involve a monotonic increase in average
employment are listed in (6b). The values of S are the average employment of firms in the relevant
structures.
￿ C (6a)




  A  ￿  PF1  ￿  PF2￿  ￿
￿ CF1 S=ak
     S=a
2k/(1-a
2)
￿ CF1, S=ak (6b)
￿ P2 ￿ ￿ A  ￿  P1 ￿  ￿ ￿ CF2 S=ak/(1-a)
  ￿ PF2  ￿  CF2
    S=ak/(1-a)
    S=ak/(1-a)    
 
A  ￿  PF1  ￿  PF2  ￿  CF2
    S=a
2k/(1-a
2)      S=ak/(1-a)
where the average employment of firms is ak/(1-a) in structure PF2, ak in CF1, a
2k/(1-a
2) in PF1, and
ak/(1-a) in CF2, and ak/(1-a)>a
2k/(1-a
2), ak. (6) is proved in the Appendix.16
5. Conclusion
In this paper we use inframarginal comparative static equilibrium analysis to show, after the
manner of Coase and North, a change in transaction cost and division of labor leads to organizational
changes in production in terms of self-sufficient production and specialization in production.
9  If we
assume that each individual maximizes total discounted utility and transaction efficiency changes over
time, our model in this paper will become a dynamic general equilibrium model which can predict
evolution of firm size over time.  Another way to extend the static model is to assume bounded rationality
and interactions between dynamic decisions and information of prices.  Zhao (1998) has developed such a
Walrasian sequential equilibrium model that can predict spontaneous evolution of the institution of the
firm and of society's knowledge of institution.
Our model predicts that the average employment of firms will decrease as division of labor
changes if transaction efficiency is improved in such a way that the transaction efficiency for intermediate
goods becomes higher than that for labor.  To test the model one needs to have good measures of the
relative transaction conditions of goods to labor.  However, these data are difficult to obtain. 
Nevertheless, empirical work of Murakami, Liu, and Otsuka (1996), and Yang, Wang, and Wills (1992)
have provided indirect evidence for this theory.  Murakami, Liu, and Otsuka show that in China's
machine tool industry the average size of firms declined while division of labor and productivity rose in
the 1980s.  Yang, Wang, and Wills show that an institution and policy index (a weighted average of 12
subindices of transaction conditions for four types of properties and three components of property rights)
that affects transaction efficiency in China increased in the 1980s.  The subindex for transaction efficiency
of goods was higher than that of labor during that period.  These two pieces of empirical work indirectly
support the hypothesis based on our theory.  More empirical work needs be done to test our theory.17
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Since the corner equilibrium that generates the highest per capita real income is the general
equilibrium, the general equilibrium can be identified by comparisons among per capita real incomes in
all structures.
A comparison between u(P1) and u(PF1), or between u(P2) and u(PF2) yields
u(PF1)>u(P1) iff s>t and (7)
u(PF2)>u(P2) iff s>r.
This implies that for a given pattern of partial division of labor, the institution of the firm will be used in
the general equilibrium to organize the division of labor iff the transaction efficiency for labor (s) is
higher than the transaction efficiency for intermediate goods (r or t). Comparisons among u(C), u(CF1)
and u(CF2) yield the following results.
u(C) > u(CF1) and u(CF2) if s<Min{r, (rt
a)
1/(1+a)}  (8a)
u(CF1) > u(C) and u(CF2) if s˛(r, t) & t>r. (8b)
u(CF2) > u(C) and u(CF1) if s>Max{t, (rt
a)
1/(1+a)}  (8c)
(8) together with Table 2 imply that the larger the transaction efficiency for labor compared to that for
intermediate goods, the more likely the general equilibrium is a structure involving the institution of the
firm, and that the larger the transaction efficiency for labor compared with that for intermediate goods,
the larger is the employment of a firm.
Since the general equilibrium, which is the corner equilibrium with the highest per capita real
income, will shift between corner equilibria as transaction efficiency parameters reach some critical
values, there are many possible paths of such development in the division of labor, indicated by the
arrows with numbers in Figure 1. The critical values can be identified by comparing per capita real
incomes in all structures. Such comparisons yield the following results.18
Shift 1, A￿P1, will take place if kt increases to the critical value kt>b0 (9)
Shift 2, A￿PF1, will take place if ks increases to the critical value ks>b0
Shift 3, P1￿P2, will take place if k and r increase to the critical value k
1-ar/t
a>b1
Shift 4, P1￿PF2, will take place if k and s increase to the critical value k
1-as/t
a>b1
Shift 5, PF1￿P2, will take place if k and r increase to the critical value k
1-ar/s
a>b1
Shift 6, PF1￿PF2, will take place if ks increases to the critical value (ks)
1-a>b1
Shift 7, P2￿C, will take place if k increases to the critical value t/r
1-a>b2
Shift 8, P2￿CF1, will take place if k and t increase to the critical value st
a/r>b2
Shift 9, P2￿CF2, will take place if s and r increase to the critical value s
1+a/r>b2
Shift 10, PF2￿C, will take place if r and t increase to the critical value rt
a/s>b2
Shift 11, PF2￿CF1, will take place if t increases to the critical value t
a>b2














It can be shown that the size and scope of firms will decrease if the development in division of
labor follows the structure sequences : A￿P1￿PF2￿C (paths 1, 4, 10 in Figure 1), 
A￿P1￿PF2￿CF1 (paths 1, 4, 11 in Figure 1), A￿PF1￿PF2￿C (paths 2, 6, 10 in Figure 1), and
A￿PF1￿PF2￿CF1 (paths 2, 6, 11 in Figure 1).  According to (7-9), this will take place if transaction
efficiencies for goods and labor increase but the transaction efficiency for labor does not increase too fast.
On the other hand, the employment of firms will increase if the development in division of labor
follows the structure sequences A￿P1￿P2￿CF1 (paths 1, 3, 8 in Figure 1), A￿P1￿P2￿CF2 (paths
1, 3, 9, in Figure 1), and A￿PF1￿PF2￿CF2 (paths 2, 6, 12 in Figure 1). According to (7-9), this will
take place if transaction efficiencies for goods and labor increase or the transaction efficiency for labor
increases more quickly than the transaction efficiency for intermediate goods. The results are summarized19
in (6).  Figure 1 or (9), combined with Table 2 imply that as transaction efficiencies for labor, and
intermediate and final goods are improved, the level of division of labor increases. Individuals' level of
specialization, trade dependence, per capita real income, and the number of specialized activities increase.
This change will not involve the institution of the firm if the transaction efficiency for labor is lower than
that for intermediate goods. The institution of the firm will emerge from the development in division of
labor if the transaction efficiency is higher for labor than for intermediate goods.
(6), (7), (8), and (9) are sufficient to establish Proposition 1.20
Footnotes
1. For data on the U.S., U.K. and France, see Loveman and Sengenberger (1991).  For data on
Austria, see Aiginger and Ticky (1991) and for Belgium, see Storey and Johnson (1987).
2. See Kim and Nugent (1993).
3. See Hu (1991).
4. A firm's decision to increase its level of specialization which leads to the equilibrium
phenomenon of disintegration and increasing division of labor between firms is called
"outsourcing", "downsizing", "returning to core competencies", and "diverting unrelated
businesses" in the literature of management.  See for instance, Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
5. Jones (1995a,b) shows that empirical evidence rejects positive effect of scale of the investment
and R&D sector on economic growth.
6. The alternative formulation was suggested by the Editor which we gratefully acknowledge.  Our
specification of iceberg transaction technology is not as realistic as endogenous transaction costs
caused by moral hazard and adverse selection.  It is not as sophisticated as communication cost
based on knowledge in Camacho (1991) but it avoids formidable indices of origins and
destinations of deliveries and other technical difficulty.
7. The model of Yang and Ng (1995) of the firm is similar to the model in this paper.  But their
model has only two goods, so that it is not rich enough to predict declining firm size as division
of labor changes.  We need a model with at least 3 goods to predict the following concurrent
phenomena: change of division of labor, declining employment of the firm, and growth of per
capital real income and productivity.
8. The proof of this statement is available from the authors.
9. Change in division of labor in this paper is based on comparative statics.  It is exogenous and
cannot take place in the absence of exogenous change of transaction efficiency parameters.  A
dynamic version of the model is developed by Borland and Yang (1995) to generate endogenous
evolution of the firm.21
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